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Roger Ballard 
1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of Britain’s South Asian population during the second half of the twentieth 
century, such that it included nearly two million people by the turn of the millennium, is best 
understood as the most recent manifestation of a dynamic series of inter-connections between 
the British Isles and the Indian subcontinent which were first began to emerge as Britain set 
about an Imperial presence in South Asia, and which are now developing yet further – albeit 
on rapidly changing terms – in a post-Imperial context. In that process of transformation  
1947 was a turning point in three quite separate senses. In the first place it marked the point 
at which, as Pandit Nehru put it, India fulfilled its tryst with destiny, and thus awoke to life 
and freedom: the British Raj had come to an end. Secondly, and just as significantly, it did so 
not as a single unit, but as two separate states, which were before long to become three: India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh – each of which have followed increasingly different socio-
economic trajectories as the years have passed. Thirdly, and just as importantly it marked the 
start of Britain’s post-war economic boom, and with it the beginnings of a phenomenon 
which ultimately precipitated some equally significant transformations in the character of 
Anglo-Indian relationships: the large scale immigration of migrant workers of South Asian 
descent. 
 
Not that labour immigration was in any sense a novel phenomenon, particularly in Britain’s 
industrial cities. Every period of rapid industrial expansion during the nineteenth century 
precipitated acute shortages of unskilled manual labour, and the gaps were filled by recruiting 
additional hands from elsewhere, firstly from the countryside, then from Ireland, and 
subsequently from Eastern Europe. However as the post-war economic boom began to take 
off the ground, these traditional reservoirs could no longer provide the necessary manpower, 
with the result that employers had no alternative but to adopt a much more open-minded 
attitude to labour recruitment. This led to a profound transformation. Whilst people of colour 
who found their way to Britain – as seamen, for example – had hitherto found it virtually 
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impossible to break into the local labour market, they suddenly found that foremen were 
willing to take them on, albeit to undertake tasks which no-one else was prepared to do. And 
although all this was initially regarded as a temporary measure – no less by migrant workers 
than by their employers – it set in train what eventually proved to be a process of reverse 
colonisation. Imperial transactions had manifestly ceased to be a one-way process.   
 
However such massive role-reversals do not occur instantaneously. Hence whilst 1947 may 
indeed have been a crucial turning-point, the foundations on which the process of mass 
migration subsequently grew up had begun to be laid down many years earlier. Moreover the 
transformation is still under way. To be sure Britain’s Indian Raj collapsed many years ago. 
Nevertheless the ideological assumptions which generated when it was still in place, such that 
British of thinking and acting were confidently assumed to be innately superior to all things 
Indian are still secretly shared by most members of Britain’s indigenous majority. But 
although British South Asians therefore still have an uphill struggle on their hands, they are 
by no means pawns in the face of the resultant forces of racial and ethnic exclusionism. Far 
from it. Just as in the process of migration itself, both settlers and their offspring have been 
actively – and indeed very successfully – engaged in devising all manner of strategies with 
which to resist, and indeed to subvert, the worst aspects of the exclusionary pressures to 
which they found themselves exposed. In many respects reverse colonisation, mounted in this 
case ‘from below’, has been a key to their success. Besides providing a highly effective basis 
for the construction of networks of mutual support, the maintenance of swadeshi-inspired 
lifestyles and their associated conceptual structures has provided settlers – and even more so 
their British-born offspring – with a series of equally effective platforms from which to 
challenge the ideological assumptions of Britain’s indigenous majority. 
 
On the face of it these developments are a comprehensively British phenomenon. Not only 
have they been generated in the context of the local social order, but they are also 
precipitating some far-reaching changes in its character. Nevertheless members of each of 
Britain’s many South Asian communities are also involved in an elaborate series of 
transnational linkages, most of which are grounded in ties of kinship, such that they also 
continue to participate in all sorts of significant ways in their communities of origin in the 
subcontinent. However the intensity of these linkages varies. For those who grew up in South 
Asia, such ties are normally still intense: many still dream of returning ‘home’ on a 
permanent basis, as they had almost all initially assumed to be the case. By contrast those 
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born and raised overseas have – as we shall see – a much more complex relationship with 
their ancestral origins.  
 
2 The growth of the South Asian presence in Britain 
2.1 Early history 
Although mass migration from South Asia was essentially a late twentieth century 
phenomenon, its foundations were laid down much earlier: indeed contacts with Britain had a 
history almost as long as the Imperial project itself. In her study of such contacts during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Vizram (1986) identifies three major categories of 
sojourner. Firstly the personal servants of Imperial adventurers and administrators, who 
accompanied their masters (and mistresses) on their eventual return home; secondly seamen, 
all of whom worked in an equally menial capacity on British merchant ships, since they 
invariably served in the stokehold; and thirdly much more affluent travellers who came to 
Britain in search of a mixture of adventure, excitement and professional qualifications. Both 
Gandhi and Jinnah fell into the latter category. But until the beginning of the twentieth 
century the South Asian presence in Britain remained minute. At any given time it would 
have  included no more than a few hundred Ayahs and Lascars, a rather smaller number of 
students seeking professional qualifications, whilst the number of Princes and other 
aristocrats – most of whom only made the briefest of visits – could probably have been 
counted on the fingers of one hand. 
 
However the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 brought about some dramatic changes. Since 
so many male members of the indigenous working class had left for the trenches, acute 
shortages of industrial labour soon emerge. As a result ex-seamen who had hitherto scratched 
out a living as pedlars suddenly found that their physical appearance was no longer an 
obstacle to gaining waged employment. Secondly, and just as importantly, several British 
Indian regiments were sent over to France to reinforce the war effort. Since the use of  Indian 
troops in European context was wholly unprecedented, exceptional, it was taken for granted 
they should promptly be shipped back to India once hostilities were over. Nevertheless a 
small number of sipahis bucked the trend. Taking advantage of their temporary presence in 
the Imperial heartlands, they took take a leaf out of the ex-lascars’ book: having slipped 
quietly AWOL, they sought to take advantage of local opportunities.  
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However the going turned out to be extremely tough, no less for the ex-seamen than the ex-
soldiers, since demobilised English soldiers, who were invariably given preferential access to 
the few available jobs. Yet despite the immense difficulties they faced, many of these early 
pioneers ultimately achieved a modicum of success. However very few did so by means of 
waged employment: instead most became pedlars, selling cheap clothing door-to-door, often 
in remote rural areas. Indeed their entrepreneurial efforts were so successful that by the early 
1930s they began to send word back to home to their kinsmen, indicating that if they could 
find their way to Britain there would be able to earn and save far more than they ever could 
as peasant farmers back in Punjab – the region from which the great majority of seamen and 
soldiers had been recruited. Hence when hostilities broke out once again in 1939, small 
colonies of South Asian pedlars – the great majority of whom were of Punjabi origin – had 
established themselves most of Britain’s larger ports, as well as in many of its major 
industrial cities.  
2.2 The post-war economic boom and its consequences 
Just as had happened two decades before, wartime labour shortages opened up all sorts of 
opportunities which had previously been closed to people of colour. Not only did many 
pedlars switch over to waged employment, especially in  the munitions factories of central 
and northern England, but they were also joined by a significant number of ex-seamen whose 
ships had been torpedoed in the Atlantic, and for whom the shift from stoke-hold to foundry 
was relatively straightforward. Whilst the precise number of men involved (for the South 
Asian presence in Britain was then exclusively male) is hard to estimate, but is unlikely to 
have been much greater than a few thousand when hostilities ended in 1945. 
 
At this point some sojourners took the first opportunity to return home: one such returnee 
who had a made a small fortune selling black-market nylons which his kinsmen serving on 
convoys had bought cheaply in New York told me how he had used his savings to buy a 
motor car from a departing sahib on the dockside in Karachi. Then he drove it all the way 
back to his village in District Mirpur, far to the north. His was a homecoming to be proud of! 
However many others decided to stay on, in the hope of reaping yet more benefits from their 
British environment. At first the going was extremely tough, just as it had been after the end 
of the first World War. However it was not long before the British economy not only picked 
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up once again, and then moved into a period of sustained economic boom which turned out to 
last – barring a few temporary hiccups – right through until the end of the nineteen seventies.  
 
Having found themselves in the right place at the right time, the pioneer sojourners promptly 
took advantage of these burgeoning opportunities. Not only did they move into the newly 
available jobs for themselves, but they also went out of their way to assist their kinsmen and 
fellow villagers to make their way to Britain. The result was an ever-expanding process of 
chain migration which enabled members of the third-world peasantry who were fortunate to 
live in and around the villages from which the early pioneers were drawn to gain direct access 
to waged employment in metropolitan Britain. To be sure they started right at the bottom of 
the industrial hierarchy, but nevertheless the hourly wages even in those jobs produced an 
income stream which was far higher than anything they could hope to tap into back home, 
especially if they were prepared to work twelve hours shifts six or even seven days a week – 
as many did.  
2.3 Who were the migrants?  
Although the rapid growth of Britain’s South Asian population set off by the resultant 
processes of chain migration was very much a function of the post-war economic boom, these 
macroscopic ‘push’ factors cannot begin to explain why it was that the vast majority of 
settlers were drawn from a few highly restricted areas in the subcontinent, or on how it came 
about that members of each of these groups have tended to follow ever more diverse 
strategies of adaptation since they arrived in the UK.  In community-specific terms, the vast 
majority of Britain’s current South Asian population can be placed in one or other of four 
broad categories. Firstly there are the Gujaratis, most of whom are drawn from coastal 
districts in Saurashtra and round into the gulf of Cambay: within a current population around 
three quarters of a million, roughly 80% are Hindus and the remainder Muslim. A second 
major category is composed Punjabis from the Jullundur Doab: within a current population of 
around half a million, 80% are Sikhs and the remainder either Hindu or Christian. Thirdly 
there is an even more substantial body of Punjabi Muslims: well over half a million strong – 
for their numbers are currently growing very rapidly – around three-quarters trace their 
origins to the barani areas of Mirpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi and Gujrat Districts, accompanied 
by numerous much smaller inflows from Chhach, Faisalabad, Lahore and so forth. Last but 
not least there are the Bangladeshis: with numbers currently approaching a quarter of a 
million, they are overwhelmingly drawn from District Sylhet in the far north-east. 
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Each of these inflows has its own specific historical roots, which are particularly ancient in 
the Gujarati case. Trading links between the Gulf of Cambay and the Persian Gulf were 
established well over three millennia ago, and in the immediate pre-Imperial period Gujarat 
was a major centre for the manufacture of cotton textiles, a large proportion of which was 
exported – mainly by Gujarati merchants – to all quarters of the Indian Ocean, and later on to 
Europe (Chaudhury, 1990). But although its local economy suffered a severe setback when 
Lancashire-based engineers managed to mechanise Gujarati textile technology, the Gujeratis’ 
entrepreneurial capacities remained undimmed. Hence when Britain began to open up its 
newly-acquired East African possessions in the early years of the twentieth century, the 
Gujeratis were ready and willing to make the most of new opportunities, whether as 
craftsmen and engineers, or as small-scale traders in the interior. But although many 
prospered in those roles (see Chapter **), their status was swiftly undermined the East 
African colonial edifice collapsed during the course of the nineteen sixties. Whilst some of 
the settlers returned to India, the great majority took advantage of their formal status as 
British subjects to move onwards to the UK, where they received a ready welcome from 
enterprising kinsfolk who had already established a foothold cities such as Leicester. 
 
By contrast the route by which the three other major components of Britain’s South Asian 
population found their way to the UK conforms much more closely to the model set out in the 
previous section. Since the British Indian regiments posted to France during the first World 
War were largely recruited in the Punjab, the pedlar communities who provided the 
foundation for mass migration after the end of the second World War were largely composed 
of Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims. Meanwhile ex-seamen provided the bridgeheads around 
which two further communities – the Mirpuris from what is now Azad Kashmir, and the 
Sylhetis from north eastern Bangladesh, from where the vast majority of lascars serving in 
the British  merchant navy were recruited – also began to establish themselves in the UK. 
Once the mass-transit system promoted by chain migration was in place, these four 
communities gained a near-monopoly of migratory opportunities within the British labour 
market. However much members of other communities rooted elsewhere in the sub-continent 
might wish to muscle in to these arenas, they were in no position to compete with the 
operators of these well-established networks.   
 7
2.4 Diversities in trajectories of adaptation and mobility 
The founders of all the major components of Britain’s South Asian population shared many 
commonalities. Not only were virtually all of them of rural origin, and either peasant-farmers 
or craftsmen by trade, but very few arrived with any significant educational or professional 
qualifications. Yet despite their shared socio-economic background, members of each group 
– and even more so their  British-born offspring – have followed sharply differing trajectories 
of adaptation and upward mobility as the years have passed.  
 
In the very broadest of terms, Gujaratis, and most especially Gujarati Hindus who made their 
way to Britain via East Africa, have led the way upwards and outwards from the sub-
proletarian position from which they all began, although the Punjabis from the Jullundur 
Doab – both Sikh and Hindu – were soon hot on their heels. Most members of the older 
generation used business enterprise as their stepping stone to success, usually starting with 
the ubiquitous corner shop, before moving on to establish much larger enterprises in either 
wholesaling, services or in manufacturing. Meanwhile a high proportion of their British-born 
offspring are achieving a spectacular degree of educational success. Law, Pharmacy, 
Accountancy and particularly Medicine are the preferred routes to upward mobility: no less 
than 20% of the places in Britain’s medical schools are now filled by the children of British 
Asian (and very largely British Indian) parents.  
 
But whilst the Gujaratis and the Doabi Punjabis have generally been spectacularly successful 
(although close inspection also reveals that upward mobility is still strongly conditioned by 
caste), members of other two major components of the South Asian population – namely the 
Mirpuris and Sylhetis – have (thus far at least) lagged some way behind. This is not to 
suggest that the Mirpuris and the Sylhetis have in any way ‘failed’: on the contrary it is plain 
that they have achieved a great deal. Hence a better way of putting it is that members of these 
communities have not, as yet, been able to carve out trajectories of upward mobility which 
are set at anything like as steep an angle as those now routinely being followed by their 
Gujarati and the Doabi Punjabi peers.    
 
How, though, are these differentials to be explained? Although many observers are tempted 
to adopt the commonsense assumption that there will inevitably be a high degree of 
correlation between ‘assimilation’ and upward socio-economic mobility, the picture which is 
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currently emerging is proving to be a great deal more complex. Indeed there are very good 
reasons for suggesting that although the concept of assimilation is much used in public 
discussion, the use of such a terminology is much more of a hindrance than a help when one 
sets out to explore the strategies of adjustment adopted by both settlers and their locally-born 
offspring have set about coming to terms with their British environment.  
 
In the first place it goes without saying that settlers – and even more so their locally-born 
offspring – have been profoundly affected by their exposure to English social, cultural and 
linguistic conventions: indeed most members of the second generation are just as much at 
home in British as in South Asian cultural contexts. However cultural competence is in no 
sense a zero-sum game, such that the acquisition of the capacity to act and react appropriately 
in one arena precipitates, of necessity, a diminution of competence in others. Quite the 
contrary. A much more illuminating way of reading what has gone on is that members of 
Britain’s South Asian communities have swiftly acquired a high level of bi- and indeed multi-
cultural competence, such that they – just like members of all sorts of other similarly placed 
minority groups – are able to act and react appropriately in a wide range of differently 
ordered arenas. Hence whilst most British South Asians have now developed fluent capacity 
you participate in arenas exclusively organised according to the conventional expectations of 
members of Britain’s dominant ethnic majority, this is in no way necessarily associated with 
an abandonment of their own ancestral roots, expectations and loyalties. Indeed it is precisely 
because the vast majority of settlers have continued to organise their domestic lives on their 
own terms that they have simultaneously managed to construct their most vital resource: the 
ethnic colonies which are now such a salient feature of the inner-urban environment through 
the length and breadth of the United Kingdom (Ballard 1994). 
2.5 The dynamics of adaptation 
Whist these ‘little Indias’ are undoubtedly partially rooted in emotional feelings of nostalgia, 
it would be a gross mistake to assume that this is the principal reason for their emergence. 
Rather they are much better understood as ethnic colonies, or in other words as active arenas 
for the articulation and development of a distinctive set of human, economic and conceptual 
resources. As such they are the prime source of the social, cultural, spiritual and 
psychological capital on the basis of which to launch an ever widening series of challenges to 
which their members would otherwise have be defencelessly exposed. But although 
resistance in this sense is very much the norm, such that all sections of the South Asian 
 9
population have been able to make a substantial degree of progress since their arrival in the 
UK, it is far from being a uniform phenomenon. Not only have the strategic objectives which 
members of each the many communities of which this broad population category is 
composed have set for themselves varied enormously, but so have the tactics they devised as 
they sought to reach them. As a result some very striking differences between the trajectories 
of mobility which each community has followed have now begun to emerge.  
 
As is only to be expected these trajectories of mobility, grounded as they very largely are in 
the entrepreneurial exploitation of less well defended chinks in the established socio-
economic order, and further reinforced by the creative utilisation of their resources of moral, 
cultural, psychological and familial alterity, have many dimensions. On the economic front 
settlers have gradually moved away from the sub-proletarian occupations into which they 
were initially directed, partly in an explicit search for opportunities which brought more 
substantial material rewards, and partly because many of those jobs – in textiles and heavy 
engineering – simply disappeared in the midst of Britain’s industrial holocaust in the early 
1980s. Members of those communities which were already set on moving upwards and 
outwards, as were most of those Gujarati and Indian Punjabi origin were relatively little 
handicapped by these adversities. Not only had they already begun to diversify into all 
manner of small business enterprises – a trend which was now strongly reinforced – but their 
children were also doing well at school and college, from which an ever greater proportion 
now began to emerge with professional qualifications. This was also associated with parallel 
processes of residential mobility. Even before recession struck, many members of these 
communities had begun to move out of the decaying inner-city areas in which they had 
originally settled in favour of more attractive properties in the suburbs, where educational 
provisions were also of a much higher standard: as the 1980s progressed, this trend was yet 
further reinforced. Nor did mobility stop there. As young Asian professionals gradually began 
to realise just how seriously glass ceilings were likely to constrain their ambitions, more and 
more decided that the best solutions was to move onwards yet again – most especially to 
Canada and the United States. Not only did they find the constraints of racial and ethnic 
exclusionism to be much less severe on the far side of the Atlantic, but most were also able to 
take advantage plug into a ready-made network of ethnic conies which their kinsmen and 
caste-fellows had already begun to establish in North America. (See Chapters ** and **). 
Whilst it is extremely difficult to make an accurate estimate of the scale of such onward 
migration, a comparison of the results of the 1981 and 1991 Censuses suggest that the 
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outflow during that period was in the order of 10,000 persons (virtually all of them ‘Indian’) 
per annum; moreover there can be little doubt that the scale of the outflow across the Atlantic 
increased substantially during the course of the following decade.  
 
Yet although the settlers who ancestral roots lay in Gujarat and East Punjab overcame the 
obstacles with which they found themselves confronted with very considerable success – 
although it is also worth noting that these patterns were in turn yet further conditioned by 
issues of religious, caste and sectarian affiliation – the trajectories followed by two further 
components of South Asian presence in Britain, namely the Potohari Punjabis from in and 
around the Mirpur region in Azad Kashmir, and Sylhetis from the far north-eastern corner of 
Bangladesh, have on the face of it been far less impressive. Not only have both these 
communities continued to increase very rapidly in size, partly because of their members 
relatively high fertility rate, and partly as a result of still on-going processes of family 
reunion, but in residential terms their members are still overwhelmingly confined to inner-
city areas, such that in numerical terms they actively dominate the localities which they have 
effectively colonized.  
 
Yet although the communities into which they have consequently aggregated are in many 
ways even more tight-knit, and even more mutually supportive than those established by their 
Punjabi and Gujarati counterparts, the degree of educational and socio-economic mobility 
which ‘Pakistanis’ and ‘Bangladeshis’ have so achieved is a great deal less impressive than 
those of people whom large-scale data-collection exercises categorise as ‘Indian’ (see, for 
example, Modood et al 1997). Moreover it is precisely in those cities in the Pennine region of 
northern Britain where Mirpuri and Sylheti settlers have established ethnic colonies in which 
violent clashes between the members of these communities and the police erupted during the 
summer of 2001. Moreover the extent of the underlying differences are further underlined by 
two further factors. Not only have similar disturbances not erupted in those (usually much 
more suburban) areas where other sections of the South Asian population have now 
established themselves, but many Hindu spokesmen have gone out of their way to contrast 
the much more peaceful outlook of members of their own community in contrast to what they 
suggests are the innately violent proclivities of their much less reasonable and sophisticated 
Muslim counterparts.  
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Just how much store should we put by arguments of this kind?  That very significant 
differences have now emerged as between the various subsections of Britain’s South Asian 
population is plain to see. How, though, are they to be explained? 
2.6 Islamophobia and cultural racism? 
In considering arguments to the effect that it is a commitment Islam which precipitates all 
manner of pathological behaviour, it is worth remembering that almost all the most 
enthusiastic articulators of that perspective within Britain’s Hindu communities are also 
actively involved in the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, which is in turn closely affiliated with 
extreme nationalist – and hence strongly anti-Muslim – political movements back in India. In 
other words such arguments also substantially replay an ideological position which has 
largely been responsible for precipitating an ever-sharper degree of ethno-religious 
polarisation between India’s Hindu majority and its Muslim minority. Given the context in 
which they were originally generated, loaded arguments of this kind clearly need to be treated 
with extreme care. Unfortunately, however, such arguments are grounded in a perspective 
which is closely congruent with (and which has to a significant extent been derived from) 
deep-seated European assumptions of the necessary inferiority of all things Islamic (Daniel, 
198*, Ballard 1997). Hence there is a strong sense in which members of Britain’s indigenous 
majority as well its Hindu minority all share a common commitment to Islamophobia. Indeed 
it is on this basis that Modood has argued that the principal cause of British Muslims’ much 
more severe condition of relative deprivation as opposed to their Hindu and Sikh counterparts 
is the outcome result of their exposure to a virulently Islamophobic form of cultural racism.  
 
Yet just how great is the explanatory force of such an argument? Whilst it is undoubtedly the 
case that anti-Islamic sentiments are even more deeply entrenched component of the British 
cultural tradition than they are in South Asia, there is little evidence that most members of the 
indigenous majority can accurately differentiate between South Asians who are Muslims and 
those who have other religious affiliation: indeed in the first instance they are all popularly 
identified as ‘Pakis’. If so it seems most unlikely that potential discriminators preferential 
treatment of Hindu and Sikh South Asians as compared with their Muslim counterparts is the 
central source – or even a marginally significant source – of the marked differentials between 
the socio-economic achievements of members of these two broad population groups. This is 
not, of course to suggest that ethno-racial exclusionism is not a very significant handicap, but 
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only that to suggest that its impact is likely to be broadly similar on members of both groups, 
and that we therefore need to look elsewhere in order to explain the observed outcomes.  
2.7 Social capital? 
With that in mind, alternative – and more plausible – explanations of these differences are no 
hard to identify. Whilst only a small minority of South Asian migrants arrived in Britain with 
technical and professional qualifications beneath their belts, so enabling them to compete 
(although with how much success is another matter) at much higher levels in the employment 
market, and although the vast majority who were of rural origin all shared the strengths of a 
broadly peasant outlook, it is now quite clear that the precise levels of prosperity which 
settlers enjoyed immediately prior to their arrival had a far reaching impact on the trajectories 
of adaptation which they subsequently followed. In this respect not only were the skills and 
competencies acquired by those who had spent some time in East Africa before moving on to 
Britain clearly a major adaptive resource, but levels of economic development in direct 
migrants’ villages of origin also had a similar effect. Hence migrants drawn from areas with a 
long-standing history of agricultural prosperity, as in the case of the Jullundur Doab in 
Punjab, and the Saurastra region of Gujerat also found they had richer resources of social 
cultural capital – particularly in terms of educational experience and technical skills – than 
those who arrived from much less agriculturally prosperous (and so much less economically 
developed) areas such as Mirpur and Sylhet. This is not, of course, to suggest that Mirpuris 
and Sylhetis will consequently remain for ever handicapped as a result background, but only 
that they had a considerable amount of ground to make up as compared with their initially 
rather better equipped Jullunduri and Gujarati counterparts.  
2.8   Marriage rules and cultural capital 
Although such considerations go a long way towards explaining current variations in 
trajectories of adaptation and mobility as between differing sub-sections of Britain's South 
Asian population, it is by no means the end of the story. There are also some very significant 
differences in the cultural capital on which settlers have drawn in implementing their 
strategies of ethnic colonisation, many of which are rooted in the apparently wholly arcane 
sphere of marriage rules. Stated baldly, there is a sharp difference between the marriage rules 
followed by Hindu and Sikh migrants, all of whom practice rules of gotra exogamy, and 
those deployed by their Muslim counterparts. Amongst the latter not only are cousin-
marriages permitted, but amongst the Pakistanis, and most especially amongst the Mirpuris, 
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such marriages are actively preferred, so much so that over 60% of all Mirpuri marriages are 
contracted between first cousins.  
 
What significance might all this have? Leaving the issue of migration wholly to one side for 
one moment, the practice of gotra exogamy has two major consequences. Firstly families 
have no prior obligations with respect to either making or accepting offers of riste once their 
offspring reach marriageable age: on the contrary they can make their choices relatively 
freely within the limits of the endogamous jati; secondly the fact that all marriages are 
arranged in this way not only means that agnates (those to whom one is related by descent) 
and affines (those two whom one is related by marriage) form two quite separate and non-
overlapping social categories, but also that each family, and indeed each individual within 
each family has links with a wide range of ristedar affines who are spatially scattered across 
a number of neighbouring villages. By contrast where frequent close-kin marriage is not just 
permitted, but is the actively preferred option, that distinction is almost entirely eliminated. 
As a result kinship networks are not only much more tightly in-turned but are also very much 
less spatially extensive.  
 
However my concerns here are not so much with what consequences these differences in 
kinship structure have had within their immediate South Asian context, but rather with the 
impact which they have had not just on processes of migration and resettlement, but also on 
their users’ subsequent trajectories of adaptation and socio-economic mobility. In an earlier 
paper (Ballard 1990) I discussed at some length how it was that these differences went a very 
considerable way towards explaining why it was that Pakistanis in general, and Mirpuris in 
particular not only delayed reuniting their families in Britain for very much longer than did 
Jullunduri counterparts, but also why it was that Mirpuris also tended to form far more tight-
knit, in-turned, and hence socially and culturally conservative communities than did their 
Jullunduri – and indeed Gujarati – fellow-migrants. In other words these differences in the 
precise characteristics of the cultural capital on which members of these two broad categories 
drew – and are indeed still drawing – have yet further reinforced the differential impact of the 
differences in social capital which were outlined in the previous section. 
 
Once one takes all these issues into account – and unfortunately there is no space to explore 
all their many ramifications within the constraints of this Chapter – the almost wholly 
deprivationist view which is implicit in Modood’s concept of cultural racism can very largely 
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be put to one side. Although undoubtedly subjected to ethno-racial exclusionism, all South 
Asian settlers in Britain – whatever their specific community affiliation – are not just active 
agents in their own cause, but are making maximum use of whatever forms of social, cultural, 
technical, economic, educational and cultural capital to which they have access. There is no 
better route to upward mobility. But to the extent that the precise character of those assets 
varies as between all the many subsections of this population, so – as is only to be expected – 
their trajectories of adaptation are similarly diverse. With this in mind it follows that the 
deliverers of public services (from the Police onwards) to Britain’s Mirpuri and Sylheti 
communities such a challenging task not so much because of their perverse refusal to 
assimilate – as is commonly supposed – but rather because they are making particularly 
intensive use of their ancestral cultural capital as they build new lives for themselves in 
Britain. To be sure as recent events in Oldham and Bradford have very clearly shown, many 
members of Britain’s indigenous majority strongly resent their use of very public strategies of 
alterity; but as the police discovered to their cost, concerted attempts to ignore – and thus to 
suppress – such plurality by imposing a policy of zero tolerance are invariably entirely 
counter-productive. Whether in the riot torn Pennine region, or in much more prosperous 
cities such as Leicester and Southall in which Gujarati and Jullunduri settlers are much more 
salient, Britain has yet to wake up to the pluralizing consequences of South Asian strategies 
of ethnic colonisation. 
3 Transnational connections  
Whilst it is now becoming increasingly obvious that the consequences large scale migration 
from Britain’s former Imperial possessions in South Asia have been much more far-reaching 
than most commentators – committed as most of them were to assimilationist expectations –
ever appreciated, the impact of these processes of colonisation ‘from below’ are by no means 
restricted to Britain. On the one hand they are part of a much more global phenomenon in 
which the transnational networks ‘from below’ are steadily transforming the structure of the 
post-colonial world order, and on the other they are also having a far-reaching impact on 
migrants’ countries, regions and villages of origin. 
3.1 The dynamics of transnational networks 
Migration invariably precipitates transnational networks, which operate in at least two 
distinct but mutually complementary ways. In the first place the process of chain migration to 
which such networks give rise a kind of long-distance escalator which enables those who are 
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in a position to step on to them can thereby be transported out of the positions of relative 
poverty in which they would otherwise have been confined, and to take advantage of the 
radically enhanced patterns of opportunity available elsewhere. When the lower end of the 
escalator is located amongst very small-scale peasant farmers in the third world, whilst the 
upper end reaches into a metropolitan city in the developed world, the advantages which 
accrue from stepping aboard are immense, and lead quite directly to what the British 
authorities describe as “the pressure to migrate”. 
 
However each of the networks which support these counter-hegemonic entrepreneurial flows 
also have a much more complex internal dynamic of their own. Whilst the prospect of 
gaining access to sharply higher material opportunities elsewhere may be the proximate cause 
of stepping aboard such escalators – be they peasant farmers or software engineers – do not 
thereby leave their pasts behind them. Quite the contrary: they remain tied to their family and 
kinsfolk back home through they very same networks of reciprocity out of which the 
escalator itself is constructed. The consequences of all this are far-reaching. Not only do 
almost all migrants initially assume that their departure is but a temporary phenomenon (even 
if they subsequently find themselves taking up much more permanent residence overseas than 
they had ever expected), but no matter how long they stay abroad, most also retain strong 
feelings of obligation and loyalty to their kinsfolk back home. Hence migrants typically remit 
a substantial proportion of their earnings during their initial period of overseas residence, 
which are usually deployed in such a way as to improve the living standards, as well as the 
social standing, of their family back home. In so doing the typical initial investment is the 
construction of a new, improved, and above all prestigious family residence, followed by 
(although it is often a poor second) by investment in such things as additional agricultural 
land and machinery, providing a substantial dowry for their unmarried sisters and sponsoring 
public rituals and shrines. But although these remittance inflows frequently have a far-
reaching impact on the character and structure of the local economy, especially when chain 
migration results in a significant proportion of the local population in a specific area moving 
overseas, the long term consequences of these developments can be extremely varied.  
3.2 Family reunion and its consequences 
One of the most important determinants of the resultant outcomes is the stability of the inflow 
of migrant remittances over time, which is in turn largely a function of migrants’ strategies of 
family reunion. The reasons for this are quite straightforward. In rural contexts most extended 
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families first dip their toes into the water by sending one or more of their younger male 
members overseas, in the expectation that they will remit a substantial proportion of their 
earnings back home. However this arrangement is inevitably unstable in the longer run, since 
the migrants are thereby separated for long period not just from their wider extended family, 
but above all their wives and children. However as soon as such migrants decide to call their 
wives and children join them overseas, as (visa restrictions permitting) they almost invariably 
eventually do, the proportion of their earnings which they are in a position to remit inevitably 
drops sharply. When this occurs on a substantial scale – for such changes in family policy 
tend to occur in waves – the sudden drop in remittance flows invariably has much more than 
merely domestic consequences, since such developments swiftly puncture the remittance-
dependent booms which are invariably generated at the far end of such transnational linkages. 
 
Yet this is by no means necessarily the end of the story. In the first place it is often the case 
that once the initial wave of migrants have secured their own and their family’s position 
within the ethnic colonies which they have begun to construct around themselves overseas, 
they may once again begin to generate a surplus which makes investment back home a 
realistic possibility. Secondly, and just as importantly, there is the question of just where and 
on what basis they choose to organise their childrens’ marriages. 
3.3 Marriage strategies 
In the immediate aftermath of migration, most migrants’ marriage strategies are quite 
straightforward: they continue to make ristes for their children on exactly the same basis, and 
with just the same kind of status-inspired objective in mind, as they would have deployed had 
they stayed at home.  As a result the vast majority of early settlers’ children’s marriages were 
arranged and celebrated not in the diaspora, but in the immediate vicinity of migrants’ 
ancestral villages. Doing so not only enabled these pioneer entrepreneurs to cash in their 
global achievements for local prestige (Gardner, 1995), but also facilitated the entry of ever-
grateful sons- and daughters-in-law into the UK. 
 
In the longer run, however, the potential contradictions inherent in matches arranged in this 
way tend to become steadily more salient. When one partner (and especially the female 
partner) had been born, raised and educated in a metropolitan context, then however 
attractive a riste may have seemed to their parents, most of whom continued to operate in 
home-village terms, there was nevertheless a strong prospect that their offspring would view 
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the person with whom they were being hitched up as little more than an unsophisticated rural 
hick who is wholly unable to keep her (and more especially his) end up either socially or 
economically in a European context. Given their unpropitious foundations, such matches 
frequently ran into difficult; worse still a significant proportion began to collapse in mutual 
acrimony.  
 
Whilst parents were often angered and perplexed by these developments, their offspring were 
only too well aware of the underlying contradictions: hence they began to mount ever more 
pressing campaigns to persuade their elders to change their marriage strategies. Significantly 
enough, few suggested that customary preferences for caste endogamy and so forth should be 
completely abandoned; rather they urged their parents to make much more active attempts to 
seek out ristes within the ethnic colonies which were growing up overseas, rather than 
automatically putting out feelers back home.  
 
However the outcome of these efforts have been far from uniform, for the younger 
generation’s success in introducing these reforms has turned out to be heavily dependent on 
the character of the marriage rules conventionally deployed with the community to which 
they belonged. Where the choice of riste is relatively open – as it is in the case where gotra 
exogamy is the norm – it was very easy for parents to redirect their search towards a 
diasporic arena. Since they had no prior obligations to offer such riste in any given direction, 
they did not disappoint anyone in particular by so doing. However in systems where there is 
cousin marriage is the norm, such that brothers and sisters expect to be given priority in the 
arrangement of riste between each others children, the reverse is the case. Not only do 
migrants’ close kin back home take it for granted that their offers of riste should be accepted 
as a matter of principle, , on the grounds firstly that they have a right first refusal with respect 
to such a match, and secondly that those who have been fortunate enough to establish 
themselves overseas have a powerful moral obligation to assist their nephews and nieces take 
that crucial first step onto the escalator. In these circumstances young people’s protests that 
the relationship might not work out are much more likely to be buried in the face of 
overwhelming feelings of wider family obligation – and thus to be over-ridden. 
3.4 The construction of transnational networks in an exogamous context 
By the end of the nineteenth century Sikh and Hindu entrepreneurs from the Jullundur Doab 
had begun to establish themselves in a number of overseas destinations, including Singapore, 
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Hong Kong, British Columbia and East Africa. To this day evidence of their success is still 
readily visible in their home villages in the form of crumbling palaces still showing the last 
remnants of the colourfully decorated stuccoed faced in the prestigious styles typical of the 
early twentieth century. As one walks through such villages careful inspection allows one to 
identify a whole succession of different building styles, firstly those which feature much 
larger modern bricks in the British colonial style, then those which make increasingly 
extensive use of reinforced concrete, until one eventually reaches recently constructed kothis 
featuring marble floors and elaborately pillared balconies. However what is particularly 
striking about all these buildings, regardless of their age, is that they rarely appear to have 
been lived in for very long. Invariably built in what was the height of fashion in their time, 
they appear above all to have been constructed as very public markers of their builders’ 
overseas achievements; but to the extent that it was only possible for emigrants to finance 
such initiatives relatively late in life – by which time their wives and children had most 
usually joined them overseas – these palaces rarely formed the principal focus of their 
owners’ extended families’ domestic activities.  
 
But whilst this provides the clearest possible evidence that most migrants adopted an 
overseas domicile relatively quickly, that certainly did not mean that their transnational 
linkages had come to a swift end. Far from it. On the one hand these elaborately constructed 
palaces were a very public statement that still cared a great deal about their status and 
reputation back home, no matter how extended their absence overseas may have been. 
Secondly their fellow villagers were themselves keen to keep those links open – for without 
them they would lose the opportunity to place their own offspring on the escalator to 
metropolitan prosperity. During the early phases of Jullunduri emigration, during which 
migrants’ most favoured destinations lay in East Asia, East Africa and the West coast of 
North America, most of those involved still preferred to arrange their children’s riste back 
home in Punjab, which could be elaborately celebrated in those carefully constructed palaces. 
 
But although this pattern was also sustained during the initial phases of settlement in Britain, 
by the early nineteen seventies some radical changes began to take place. Thanks to the 
availability of substantial numbers of  potentially suitable partners in the UK,  together with 
growing pressure from young people themselves, a shift of strategy began to take place. As 
we saw earlier, an ever-increasing number of riste began to be arranged within the overseas 
arena. However what is also very striking about these developments is that they soon ceased 
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to be constrained by national boundaries. Although still overwhelmingly caste-specific, the 
Jullunduri marriage market soon became global in character, reaching out to Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Kenya, and above all to North America. Kinship networks had not only become global 
in scope, but to the extent that matches which spouses with spouses based in India came to be 
regarded as a fall-back option which was only seriously considered when a suitable 
arrangement could not be made in the diaspora, the whole edifice was steadily disconnecting 
itself from its Punjabi roots, and in that sense moving further and further ‘offshore’. That 
process continues with some vigour – particularly amongst young well-educated 
professionals – to this day. 
3.5 Close kin marriage and the construction of transnational networks  
Unlike Jullundur, Mirpur does not lie in the easily irrigable plains of Punjab, but at the point 
where the Potohar plateau runs into the outer foothills of  the Himalayas, just to the east of 
the river Jhelum. Whilst a good deal more densely populated – at least in terms of persons per 
cultivable acre – than Jullundur, so the mean size of each family’s holdings is, and always has 
been, very much smaller. Moreover Mirpuris also suffered from a further disadvantage: their 
incorporation into the Princely state of Kashmir, whose rulers were notorious for imposing 
high taxes on their subjects, whilst providing a much lower level of public services than those 
available in neighbouring Districts in British India. Against all this Mirpur has only one 
positive environmental advantage: its close proximity to the mountains of the Pir Panjal 
means that the District receives a high and largely reliable rainfall. Given all this, not only 
has Mirpur’s population always been a good deal less prosperous than Jullundur’s, but its 
members have had – and still have – access to many fewer infrastructural resources. Yet 
despite all these disadvantages the Mirpuris have become even more extensively involved in 
transnational activities than the Jullunduris, even if the consequences of that engagement has 
precipitated some rather different outcomes.  
 
Mirpuris have a long history of involvement in translocal employment, since the crews of the 
river boats which handled Punjab’s trade with the Indian Ocean had long been recruited from 
this area, as well from the Chhach District, located some fifty miles to the west on the banks 
of the river Indus. However the 1880s saw two parallel developments: first the construction 
railway links from both Karachi and Bombay into the interior of Punjab (which immediately 
undercut river transport in terms of both cost and speed), and secondly the British merchant 
navy’s switch from sail to steam. However European seamen were most unwilling to work in 
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the stokeholds of the new ships, especially in tropical conditions, so opening up an alternative 
source of employment for redundant Mirpuri and Chhachi boatmen. They jumped at the 
chance, and soon gained a virtual monopoly over stokehold jobs on merchant ships operating 
out of Karachi and Bombay – a position which they managed to sustain until oil finally 
replaced coal after the end of the second world war. 
 
But although Mirpuri and Chhachi seamen therefore had a lengthy experience of 
transnational movement, very few looked beyond the niche which they has secured within the 
global labour market. Hence whilst a few men jumped ship in search of better opportunities 
ashore in cities from London to Sydney and all points in between, the great majority appear 
to have preferred to serve out their contracts on board ship, and take their savings back to 
their villages in the Punjab at the points where the rivers Jhelum and Indus emerge into the 
plains from the northern mountains.  
 
Although mass-migration from Mirpur to Britain was no less a product of the post-war 
economic boom than was the parallel inflow from Jullundur, its dynamics turned out to be 
very different. Although a very small number of Mirpuri seamen had established themselves 
in Britain prior to the 1939, their presence was significantly boosted in the years that 
followed as sailors who had had their ships torpedoed from beneath them were drafted to 
work in Britain’s labour-starved foundries and munitions factories; moreover their numbers 
when coal-fired ships were phased out during the late 1940s, when employment in industrial 
Britain provided a welcome alternative to now-redundant stokers. But if Mirpuris established 
their beach-head in Britain, on a distinctive basis, the subsequent rapid growth in the scale of 
their presence was not: just as with the Jullunduris, there was acute demand for their labour. 
To be sure wages on offer were extremely low by British standards, and the jobs available 
were largely confined to the night shift; but from a Mirpuri perspective they offered anyone 
prepared to work long hours (12 hour shifts 6 days a week were commonplace) an excellent 
opportunity to earn and save.  
 
Nevertheless the Mirpuris set about making the most of these opportunities in a very different 
way from their Jullunduri counterparts. Whilst most of the latter set about reuniting their 
families in Britain with a year or two of arriving, most Mirpuris preferred to make regular 
visits back home. Hence may pursued a strategy of inter-national commuting for one or even 
two decades before they at long last brought their wives and children to Britain. Hence it was 
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not until the late nineteen seventies that family reunion became at all commonplace, and it 
took well over a decade before that process was anywhere near complete. took well over a 
decade to complete. At the same time Mirpuris had also begun to devise some very effective 
strategies by means of which to subvert the deliberate exclusionist objectives of Britain’s 
immigration laws. 
3.6 The Mangla Dam, employment vouchers, and cousin marriage 
Britain’s first formal effort to halt the inflow of non-European labour was the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act of 1992, which required unskilled workers from South Asia and the 
Caribbean to obtain employment vouchers before entering the UK. But despite its 
exclusionist objectives, the scheme’s initial impact was quite the opposite effect, particularly 
with respect to the Mirpuris. It is easy to see why. On the one hand the construction of 
Mangla Dam across the river Jhelum – which was completed in 1966, and which flooded 
most of Mirpur’s most fertile land – led to a sudden intensification of the pressure to migrate. 
In the absence of established transnational connections those affected would have had little 
alternative but to go along with the Government of Pakistan’s grossly inadequate offers of 
compensation and resettlement. By contrast moving on to Britain was a far more attractive 
option – always provided one had the necessary kinship connections. The procedure was 
achieved was relatively straightforward. Textile mills in Yorkshire and Lancashire were still 
acutely short of labour, and foremen and personnel managers found the new rules a godsend. 
Mirpuris already working in the mills regularly enquired as to how many extra hands were 
needed, and promised that if the requisite vouchers were issued, new workers would be ready 
to fill those slots within the month. Chain migration was consequently directly reinforced. 
However this window of opportunity did not remain open for very long. Less than three years 
later the voucher scheme was put into abeyance on the grounds that it was being ‘abused’. 
 
Even so the Mirpuris still had a number of other tricks up their sleeves. In the late sixties the 
Mirpuri presence in Britain was still overwhelmingly composed of adult males who had left 
their wives and children back home in their villages of origin, and whom they repeatedly 
visited at intervals of a couple of years or so. But as de facto British citizens, they were 
entitled to reunite their families in the UK. This precipitated a further set of cat and mouse 
developments. Established settlers’ most immediate response to the end of the voucher 
scheme was to exercise their right to call over their near-adult teenage sons (and/or their 
nephews whom they represented as their sons) to the UK, so that they could start work in the 
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mills as soon as they reached the age of 16. But although the immigration authorities sought 
to close that loophole by insisting that settlers should call over their entire family, including 
their wives and daughters rather than just their teenage sons if they wished to implement their 
rights of family reunion, this also soon backfired. As the years passed the impact of the 
migrants’ earlier strategy of transnational commuting on the quality of family life had grown 
steadily more severe, and they were by now much more ready to go along with the 
immigration authorities’ demands. Hence far from restricting the inflow, the new rules led – 
especially amongst the Mirpuris – to a further increase in the scale and the permanence of 
settlement. 
 
Nor did the process end there. When British-based Mirpuri began to arrange riste for their 
offspring, their initial preference was just the same as the Jullunduris: to set up matches on 
just the same basis as they would have done in the absence of migration. However whilst the 
Jullunduris soon switched towards seeking out suitable riste within the diaspora, Mirpuris 
found themselves much more tightly constrained – thanks to the strength of their ideological 
commitment to close kin marriage – to fulfil their obligations to those of their siblings who 
were still based back home in Mirpur, and thus to continue to arrange their childrens’ riste 
accordingly. Hence whilst the British immigration authorities have made great efforts to stop 
settlers using marriages arranged on this basis to power the operation of now well-established 
escalators between rural Mirpur and the ethnic colonies which settlers have established in a 
whole host of industrial cities in Britain, their efforts have been largely unsuccessful. At least 
half (and possibly as many as two thirds) of the marriages currently being contracted by 
young British-based Mirpuris are still arranged with their cousins from back home. Although 
these outcomes – which serve to illuminate the success with which Mirpuris have been able 
to subvert all the efforts of Britain’s immigration authorities to halt their inflow – are by no 
means solely a result of strength of their culturally grounded commitment to close kin 
marriage, they nevertheless stand in sharp contrast which have taken place within those 
groups (of whom the Hindu and Sikh Jullunduris are but a specific example) whose marriage 
rules include a commitment to descent-group exogamy.  
4 Transnational entrepreneurship and the subversion of the post-Imperial order 
Whatever additional objectives South Asian emigrants may have had, improving their own 
material conditions, as well as those of other members of their extended families and their as 
yet unborn offspring clearly lay close to their hearts. Just how far have they managed to 
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achieve that goal? In broad terms the answer is now very clear. Despite the positions of 
relative disadvantage within the subcontinent from which most of them began, and the 
despite the very substantial obstacles they encountered as the pushed their way upwards and 
outwards through post-Imperial socio-economic order, they have met with a very substantial 
degree of success. Not only have substantial numbers of settlers managed to penetrate the 
exclusionary bastions which every country in the metropolitan swiftly erected around itself, 
so enabling them to tap into the much wider range of opportunities available there, but the 
success of their entrepreneurial activities has also precipitated far reaching economic changes 
in their villages, regions and countries of origin. However the precise scope, character and 
consequences of those changes has been almost as varied as the trajectories of adaptation 
which settlers and their offspring have pursued overseas – and for much the same reasons.  
 
Yet just what can be said by way of conclusion about the causes of these differentials – let 
alone of their consequences?  
4.1 The local in the global: transnational entrepreneurial strategies in context 
In considering the numerous studies which suggest that the Mirpuris are still amongst the 
poorest of all the various South Asian communities which have now established themselves 
in Britain, and that their children are the least educationally successful, three salient factors 
are worth bearing in mind. Firstly the low level of economic development, and especially the 
lack of infrastructural resources – most particularly in terms of education – in their villages of 
origin. Secondly the tight-knit character of the kinship structures which are precipitated by 
their globally-unprecedented commitment to close kin marriage; as a result the Mirpuris’ 
commitment to the export of human capital along the escalators of chain migration has been 
sustained for very much longer, and organised to a much higher level of sophistication than 
within almost any other South Asian groups. Thirdly these kinship structures have also had  a 
far reaching impact on the way in which status seeking – an all-consuming South Asian 
priority – is conducted. As a result Mirpuris routinely find themselves driven to engage in 
ever more byzantine counter-manoeuvres in an effort to contain and subvert the efforts of 
their closest kin to advance their own interests, whilst the much more geographically 
dispersed and open-ended networks of those groups who marry exogamously ensures that 
their efforts to keep up with their rivals – be they Singhs, Kapoors, Mistris or Patels – pull 
them outwards into participation into much social arenas which by moved substantially 
offshore. In the light of all this it is small wonder that groups whose members had the good 
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fortune to arrived in Britain with much more extensive social, technical and educational 
capital than the Mirpuris, and whose kinship structures actively encouraged the elaboration of 
translocal linkages followed trajectories of upward mobility which were set at a much steeper 
angle than that achieved by the Mirpuris. 
 
However simply to cast the Mirpuris as ‘failures’ would be a gross mistake. Not only did they 
start the race with substantially greater handicaps than many of their peers drawn from 
elsewhere in South Asia, but they also chose to follow a significantly different course whilst 
running it. It all depends on one’s yardstick for ‘success’; whilst dramatically fewer Mirpuris 
may have gained professional qualifications, or moved upwards and outwards from the inner-
city areas in which they initially established residential colonies than their Jullunduri or 
Gujerati counterparts, they have nevertheless been far more successful in subverting one of 
the principle instruments whereby structures of global inequality are sustained in the 
contemporary post-Imperial world: immigration control. Of course this has only occurred on 
an intensely localized basis, but as a result of their thoroughly subversive entrepreneurial 
efforts, well over 50% of Mirpur’s population have by now managed to establish themselves 
in the metropolitan world: there is no way in which this achievement can be gainsaid.  
 
This also raises a further questions about the spatial context in which such yardsticks should 
be applied, for once a body of  people have gone transnational, it inevitably follows that 
yardsticks of success should be adjusted appropriately. Hence, for example, whilst numerous 
commentators have expressed extreme concern about the very low incomes as well as the 
poor standard of housing which Britain’s Mirpuri and Sylheti communities have enjoy, very 
few have sought to establish on what scale members of these communities are continuing to 
remit a substantial portion of their income back to the subcontinent, or the extent to which 
they have access to a second set of residential facilities in that context. Once one does take 
such issues into account, the whole picture changes dramatically. No wonder: one of the 
migrants’ central in penetrating the obstacles designed to exclude them from the metropolitan 
world was to boost their families’ status at their point of departure. Not surprisingly, they 
have also achieved a considerable degree of success in this arena, although once again to 
differing degrees, and with markedly different consequences.  
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4.2 Kinship and remittances 
 As we saw in the case of the Jullunduris, most migrants invested heavily in refurbishing the 
houses in which the remainder families still lived, and when the time was ripe – usually 
towards the end of their employment career – many built vast palaces to mark their 
achievements. However to the extent that exogamous groups were moving their domicile 
steadily offshore, most of these palaces were actually utilised much less than their builders 
had hoped an expected. The same was broadly true of their investments in agricultural land 
and machinery with which to farm it. Although substantial profits could be reaped from such 
investments, most especially in agriculturally prosperous areas such as the Jullundur Doab, 
their increasingly well qualified offspring had no interest in supervising operations on their 
ancestral holdings: if and when they did take trips India they were soon far more interested in 
visiting Agra or Goa than some village out in the sticks in Punjab. Land and houses were 
rarely sold whilst members of the older generation who had grown up in the village were still 
alive. That would have been altogether too shameful. However once they had passed away 
their offspring usually disposed of those once-cherished assets at the earliest possible 
opportunity.  
 
In the Mirpuri case the pattern of remittances was rather different. Given that they moved 
much more slowly towards family reunion, lone Mirpuri males working in Britain remitted 
the greater part of their earnings for a much longer period than their Jullunduri counterparts: 
house building therefore proceeded on a much more elaborate basis, and precipitated a huge 
boom in the local construction centre. However as a result of the combination of low levels of 
productivity in local agriculture, lack of basic infrastructural support, and the huge degree of 
wage inflation in the local labour market which was precipitated by the inflow of migrant 
remittances, agricultural investment – as opposed to speculation in land – brought no 
significant profits. Hence once spectacular new houses had been constructed, most families 
simply placed their excess funds on deposit in the bank. By the late 1970s, the local economy 
in Mirpur was already following a very  different trajectory from that in Jullundur. Although 
capital-rich, Mirpur’s superficial prosperity was grounded in a high level of dependency on 
the continuing inflow of remittances. Meanwhile in Jullundur those self-same inflows served 
a very different purpose: to add gilt to the gingerbread of an already thriving local economy.  
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4.3 Development or dependency? 
Given all this, I found myself driven to adopt some very pessimistic conclusions when I first 
began to take a comparative interest in economic developments way back in the nineteen 
eighties. Acute economic recession in the United Kingdom, which had a particularly severe 
impact on the Mirpuri community, had led to a sharp decline in the volume of migrant 
remittances; meanwhile the condition of virtual civil war which erupted in the aftermath of 
the Indian Army’s disastrous attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar ensured that members 
of the Sikh diaspora entirely lost interest in investing back home. However the impact of 
these developments in each area were very different. Whilst the Jullundur Doab may have 
suffered as a result of the loss of the gilt from its gingerbread, let alone the disastrous 
consequences of nearly a decade of civil war, its agricultural prosperity was largely 
unaffected. By contrast the Mirpuri economy appeared to be in much more serious 
difficulties. Agricultural productivity had already declined so far that the District had already 
lost the capacity to be self-sufficient in food grains, and the superficial prosperity generated 
by the construction boom of the late nineteen seventies had very swiftly faded. The local (and 
national) economy was in the midst of a severe, and apparently unstoppable, downward spiral 
(Ballard 1982, 1987).  
 
However a visit to Mirpur in the first year of the new millennium has demonstrated that such 
gloomy expectations were mistaken – at least in the short run. At least on the face of it, the 
Mirpuri economy has gone from strength to strength. A rash of new buildings, some as many 
as five or six stories high, have erupted both in the villages and the towns: those which were 
constructed in the nineteen sixties and seventies have been left entirely in the shade. There 
are numerous cars an the roads as well as teeming shoals of motor cycles; and the bazaars in 
the District’s qasbahs now boast ‘Plazas’, two-story off-street shopping malls selling all 
manner of consumer goods, whilst the sewing machines of whole streets-full of tailors 
literally hum with industry. 
 
Yet there are many ways in which all these outward signs of remittance-inspired prosperity 
are wholly misleading. Most of the grand houses turn out, on closer inspection, to be 
uninhabited: their owners have simply locked the doors and returned to England. Most also 
turn out to largely empty, with the exception of a single room which has been hurriedly kitted 
out to entertain guests. Moreover the architectural styles in which they are constructed are 
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most revealing. Most residential properties in Pakistan – including those in the nearby capital 
city of Islamabad which is entirely reserved for the elite – are invariably concealed behind 
high walls. Domestic space is very emphatically private. However the new houses going up 
in Mirpur almost entirely ignore these conventions. At present two styles of architecture 
appear to be in particular favour. The first can best be described as the sky-scraper pattern: 
multi-storied buildings which are frequently adorned with all manner of glossy decorations. 
However the fact that even in the countryside such buildings are often clustered together in 
groups where each successive construction is marginally taller than its predecessor provides 
the clearest possible indication that it is not the high cost of land which drives these 
developments. The second architectural style, which can best be described as overblown neo-
classical, featuring with vast balconies and pillared porticoes, together with elaborately 
decorated stuccoed gable ends further confirms the logic of the whole exercise. In the first 
place these are not machines for living in, but rather a very public means of expressing their 
builders’ personal achievement; secondly the audience to which these expressions are 
directed is not the world at large, but rather at their own immediate kin who have stayed back 
in Mirpur, as well as at their fellow emigrants’ house just down the road whose splendour has 
been outshone by the new erection. An elaborate game of status competition is being played 
here – and very little else. 
 
Even so the newly-revived construction boom, which in turn supports a large service sector in 
terms of brick-kilns, steel and cement distribution, let alone the largely-immigrant labour 
force which actually responsible for building these palaces, is by no means the only sphere of 
the local economy which has been boosted by the spending of returnees.  Just as significant is 
the growth of bazaars and plazas supporting myriad small shop units which provide ready-
made clothes, shoes, tableware, and host of western-style food items from Cornflakes to 
Nescafe to families making brief visits back home to celebrate their sons’ and daughters’ 
riste. In other words this is all very much a migration-specific phenomenon: there is little or 
no demand for such goods in nearby rural areas which lack Mirpur’s intense transnational 
connections. Thus in sharp contrast to Jullundur, where returnee spending only gives a 
relatively small boost to an already-thriving local market for such domestic products of this 
kind – the greater part of economic activity in Mirpur is predicated around the continued 
inflow of funds from overseas.  It follows, therefore, that if this inflow were to cease – for 
whatever reason – the consequences for the Mirpuri economy would be dire.  
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Whilst Mirpur’s success in people-export has undoubtedly generated a gloss of affluence, its 
underlying economy – which has always been grounded in small-scale peasant farming – has 
been left almost untouched. Hence whilst it is easy enough to be impressed by the rash of 
newly constructed houses and dramatic developments in the major bazaars,  Mirpur’s real – 
as opposed to visitor-fuelled – economy is still overwhelmingly agricultural. However in 
sharp contrast to Jullundur there has been no significant investment in agricultural machinery, 
or in the tube-wells and pump sets which would facilitate the production of high-value 
horticultural crops which would find a ready market in nearby Islamabad. Instead the local 
economy but become locked into a condition of dependency on its transnational linkages. 
Hence few young people in Mirpur look forward to a local future: instead the vast majority 
eagerly await an offer of riste from their kinsfolk overseas, and are vastly disappointed if it 
fails to arrive. A wry comment from one informant summed the situation up with some 
clarity. ‘We don’t cultivate wheat here any more’, he told me, ‘we cultivate visas instead’.  
5 Conclusion: the dynamics of transnationalism 
Just how can we best set about making sense of the complex and frequently paradoxical 
outcomes of the diverse forms of post-Imperial transnational entrepreneurship, of which it 
has only been possible to explore a very small portion within the limited confines of this 
Chapter? Whilst the developments outlined here offer very largely contradict the pessimistic 
and largely determinist conclusions of the greater part of late twentieth century European 
(and broadly ‘Marxist’) sociology, the wise words of the Master himself provide an acutely 
perceptive signpost as to how these developments might best be understood. As he puts in the 
opening sentences of the Eighteenth Brumaire, “Men make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past”(Marx, 18**:**) Of 
course there was much that was missing from Marx’ vision, writing as he was from a mid 
nineteenth century Eurocentric viewpoint: not only did he grossly underestimate the 
revolutionary potential of cultural alterity, but he had little comprehension of the socio-
political dynamics which would ultimately shape our contemporary post-Imperial world.  
 
Nevertheless it is quite clear that transnational entrepreneurs from South Asia, just like 
innumerable others drawn from every corner of the global periphery, are making history: 
however limited their achievements may yet have been, they are nevertheless beginning to 
undermine the established structure of the global order. But although it follows that they 
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could not do so entirely as they pleased, nor under wholly self-selected circumstances, such 
that they had to rely on chinks in the system opened up by chance contingencies, 
entrepreneurial activists ‘from below’ continue to exhibit an immense amount of creativity as 
they set about making the most of the resultant opportunities. Yet although he was acutely 
aware of the importance of agency, and of the human capacity to act on their own terms in 
order radically to change their circumstances, there was point on which Marx was grossly 
mistaken. In keeping with nineteenth century ideologies of progressivism, he assumed that 
ancestrally generated cultural assumptions would always be a handicap in the articulation of 
such processes. As the multiple dynamics of transnationalism described in this Chapter – and 
indeed throughout this volume – dramatically demonstrate, Marx and most of his followers’ 
assumptions need to be turned on their heads: it is precisely by creatively utilising the 
resources of their ancestral traditions – whatever format that they might happen to have – that 
south Asian transnational entrepreneurs have achieved so much. 
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